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Evaluating Kentucky's
Investment Tax Credits in Light of
Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc.
Bradford C. Spencer'
INTRODUCTION
N September 2, 2004, a unanimous three-judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit' held in Cuno v.
DaimlerChrysler, Inc.3 that an Ohio investment tax credit statute was un-
constitutional because it violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the
Constitution of the United States.4 This decision is particularly significant
I J.D. expected 2006, University of Kentucky College of Law; M.S. in Accounting,
University of Kentucky, 2002; and B.S. in Accounting, University of Kentucky, zoo. The au-
thor would like to thank his wife and parents for all of their love and support.
Long after the final draft of this Note was completed, the Supreme Court on September
27, 2005 granted the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S.Ct. 36 (2005). The Supreme Court
has also requested that both parties brief and argue whether the plaintiffs have standing to
challenge the Ohio investment tax credit at issue. This raises the possibility that the Court
may resolve the case on procedural grounds, thereby avoiding the constitutional question of
whether state investment tax credits violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
The author, however, believes that this note will be useful regardless of the Court's decision.
Should state investment tax credits be held unconstitutional, this Note illustrates some of the
potential alternatives that Kentucky may utilize in place of its existing investment tax credit
scheme. Conversely, if the Court holds that state investment tax credits are constitutional or
avoids the issue by deciding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim, then this note
discusses how some commentators have concluded that investment tax credits play a minor
role in business siting decisions. This point suggests that Kentucky closely examine whether
it would be better off utilizing some other type of business incentive that could truly enhance
its competitiveness vis-t-vis other states.
2 The Sixth Circuit reviews appeals from the federal district courts in Kentucky,
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee.
3 Cuno v. DaimlerChysler, Inc., 386 E3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 1z6 S.Ct. 36
(2oo5).
4 The Commerce Clause provides that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The commerce clause has been interpreted not only as conferring power
on the national government to regulate commerce, but also as limiting the states' power to
interfere with commerce. This restriction on state power often is referred to as the 'negative
implication of the commerce clause' or as the 'dormant commerce clause' principle." Philip
M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax Discrimination
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because it was the first time a federal court of appeals addressed the is-
sue of the constitutionality of state investment tax credits. A state will use
such credits to induce businesses to (1) keep from relocating their exist-
ing operations to another state or (2) make future in-state investments. If
the Sixth Circuit's decision stands,' it could spark a chain reaction in other
jurisdictions across the country, as virtually every state uses some form of
a state income tax credit or incentive to retain or attract new businesses.6
Given the widespread use of state investment tax credits, this decision has
ruffled more than a few feathers within the state and local tax community,
as well as in Congress.'
To many scholars and practitioners of state and local tax law, it was con-
sidered only a matter of time before a court would rule that state investment
tax credits represented unconstitutional exercises of state power. These
scholars and practitioners have long asserted that states' use of investment
tax credits violated the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.' Accordingly,
Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879,881-82 (1986). In short, even though Congress
has not acted to regulate a given area of interstate commerce, its power to do so lies dormant
and the states are prohibited from improperly interfering with this power of Congress.
5 On January 18, 2005, the Sixth Circuit denied a request to rehear the case en banc. See
Karen Setze, Sixth Circuit Denies Rehearing in Ohio Investment Tax Credit Case, TAx NOTES TODAY,
Jan. 19, 2005, at 13-14. The defendants in the case have indicated that they are going to ap-
peal the Sixth Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court. Ohio Tax-Incentive Ruling
Stands, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Jan. 21, 2005, at D I.
As it now stands, Cuno does establish a precedent in the Sixth Circuit with respect to
state location investment tax credits. However, the state of Ohio petitioned the Sixth Circuit
to postpone putting into effect its decision prohibiting the Ohio Department of Taxation's
administration of the credit. The Sixth Circuit, on January 3 1, 2005, granted Ohio's request to
"stay the issuance of the mandate" enjoining enforcement of the credit until the state has had
the opportunity to file a petition for a writ of certiorari appeal with the United States Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court has disposed of the case. See Information Release, Ohio Dep't
of Tax'n, Corporate Revenue Tax Information Release (Sept. 2004, revised Feb. zoo5), http://
tax.ohio.gov/divisions/communications/information releases/cft200403.stm. If the Supreme
Court denies Ohio's request for a writ of certiorari, the Sixth Circuit's decision becomes final.
The question that then arises is how broad or narrow of a precedent Cuno will establish on the
use of state investment tax credits.
6 See Timothy H. Gillis, Sixth Circuit Bans Ohio Tax Credit Under the Commerce Clause,
Casting a Pall on Incentives, ioi J. TAx'N 359, 360 (2004) (reporting that "some studies show
that there are over 330 statutory income/franchise tax credits and incentives in 46 states");
Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report, 34 UaB. LAW. 415, 417 (zooz) (stating
that "[i]nvestment tax credits, job creation credits, and property tax abatement programs have
become nearly universal").
7 See infra Part II, Section E.
8 See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, I I o HARV. L. REV. 377 (1996) (providing an in-depth analysis of
the constitutionality of state investment tax credits and contending that such credits violate
the Commerce Clause); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on
State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996) (examining the restraints
imposed by the Commerce Clause on state investment tax credits and concluding that such
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this note is not intended to enter the already crowded field of scholarship
devoted to analyzing the constitutionality of state investment tax credits
under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Rather, the purpose of this
note is two-fold. First, this note will examine the potential ramifications
that the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Cuno may have on Kentucky's investment
tax credit scheme. Second, this note will discuss alternative mechanisms
less susceptible to constitutional attack that Kentucky could use to encour-
age economic development within its borders in the event the Cuno deci-
sion establishes a precedent within the Sixth Circuit.
Part I of this note provides general background information on state
investment tax credits, including what they are and why many in the state
and local tax arena maintain that they represent an unconstitutional ex-
ercise of power by the states.' Part II discusses the factual background of
the Cuno case, as well as the decisions rendered by the district court and
the Sixth Circuit.10 Part III examines the potential impact the Cuno deci-
sion may have on Kentucky's investment tax credit scheme by compar-
ing and contrasting the investment tax credit at issue in Cuno with two of
Kentucky's investment tax credits. 1 Finally, Part IV considers other pos-
sible economic incentives that Kentucky could offer businesses in place of
its investment tax credit scheme.1
I. STATE INVESTMENT TAX CREDITS
In general, an investment tax credit is a "tax credit intended to stimulate
business investment in capital goods by allowing a percentage of the pur-
chase price as a credit against the taxpayer's income taxes."' 3 Typically,
states providing investment tax credits have various statutory requirements
that must be satisfied in order for a taxpayer to qualify for such credits. For
example, the taxpayer's investment may have to meet a specified dollar
threshold, 4 or the investment might have to create a certain number of
credits cannot withstand scrutiny under Commerce Clause analysis). It should be noted that
Enrich served as lead counsel for the plaintiffs in Cuno.
9 See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
io See infra notes 2o-9o and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes I I9-36 and accompanying text.
13 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (7 th ed. 1999); see also Enrich, supra note 5, at 426
(explaining that an investment tax credit "reduces a business' state income tax liability by a
percentage of the new cost of its new plant and equipment located in the taxing state, with
the consequence that investment in the state is rendered less costly than an identical invest-
ment elsewhere").
14 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.22-040(3), 154.28-o8o(3) (LexisNexis 2004) (requir-
ing minimum investments of $1oo,ooo in order to qualify for tax credits available under the
Kentucky Rural Economic Development Act and the Kentucky Industrial Development Act,
2005-2006]
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new jobs in a particular locality."5 If the business qualifies for the invest-
ment tax credit, then the credit may be used to reduce the entity's corpo-
rate income tax or franchise tax liability. 6
Regardless of the state-to-state differences in the qualifications for
investment tax credits, such credits are employed as an incentive to en-
courage businesses to locate their new investments in a particular state
or municipality. Moreover, the use of location tax incentives by states as a
means of spurring in-state economic development is nothing new, as states
in the South began offering property tax abatements to businesses in the
1930s. 7 Today, "[liocation incentives [like investment tax credits] have be-
come an ubiquitous feature of the state tax scene, and businesses have
come to expect them as a standard part of their siting decisions."18 As one
might expect, the fact that nearly all states provide location tax incentives
to businesses has created an intense economic battle between the states,
with the spoils being the retention or attraction of businesses in or to their
respective state. In a bit of an overstatement, one commentator has even
characterized this fight among the states as the "second war between the
states." 9 Nevertheless, the Cuno case may be the beginning of the end to
this interstate battle, particularly as it relates to states' use of investment
tax credits.
II. THE CASE OF CUNO v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER, INC.
A. Factual Background of Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc.
In 1998, the City of Toledo, Ohio, entered into an agreement with
DaimlerChrysler whereby DaimlerChrysler would receive both an invest-
respectively).
'5 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.22-O50(6), 154.28-080(3) (LexisNexis 2004) (indi-
cating that a minimum of 15 new full-time jobs must be created at the site of the economic de-
velopment project before the taxpayer may receive an investment tax credit granted pursuant
to the Kentucky Rural Economic Development Act or the Kentucky Industrial Development
Act).
16 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing that the
investment tax credit is used to offset a taxpayer's existing Ohio corporation franchise tax li-
ability); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.22-050(8), 154.28-090(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2004) (stating that
investment tax credits granted under the Kentucky Rural Economic Development Act and
the Kentucky Industrial Development Act may be used to reduce income generated by the
economic development project). See Part III of this Note for the significance of the distinc-
tion between Ohio's and Kentucky's investment tax credits and how they offset different
bases of income.
17 See Enrich, supra note 8, at 382.
18 See id. at 384.
19 Id. at 4oi.
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ment tax credit and a property tax exemption, worth a combined $280 mil-
lion, in return for its investment in a $1.2 billion Jeep Liberty vehicle-as-
sembly plant in Toledo.2° Clearly, the City of Toledo's motive in granting
these tax incentives to DaimlerChrysler was to provide an economic in-
ducement for the automobile manufacturer to make its substantial capital
investment in Ohio, as opposed to another state.
Ohio's nonrefundable investment tax credit was available to those cor-
porate taxpayers who purchased "new manufacturing machinery and equip-
ment during the qualifying period, provided that the new manufacturing
machinery and equipment" were installed in Ohio."i The credit ranged
from 7.5% to 13.5% of the portion of the investment in new equipment
that exceeded the county average for such equipment.2 The investment
tax credit could be used to reduce a taxpayer's existing Ohio corporate fran-
chise tax liability.2 3
With regard to the property tax exemption received by DaimlerChrysler,
the City of Toledo granted DaimlerChrysler a ten-year, 100% property tax
exemption. 4 The property-tax exemption was granted pursuant to an Ohio
state statute which permits Ohio municipalities to offer property tax ex-
emptions to an enterprise that "agrees to establish, expand, renovate, or
occupy a facility and hire new employees, or preserve employment oppor-
tunities for existing employees" in economically distressed areas. 5
B. The District Court's Dismissal
Subsequent to the agreement, the City of Toledo and DaimlerChrysler
(the "defendants") were both named as defendants in a suit brought by
eighteen plaintiffs 6 in the Court of Common Pleas in Lucas County,
Ohio." The case was later removed by the defendants to the United States
District Court of the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, pursu-
20 Cuno, 386 F3d at 741.
z OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33(B)(i) (LexisNexis 2005).
22 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5733-33(C)(1), (z) (LexisNexis 2005).
23 Many states, including Ohio, commonly impose a corporation franchise tax on for-
profit in-state and out-of-state corporations for the privilege of doing business in that state. In
Ohio, a corporation's franchise tax is determined by calculating the value of the entity's issued
and outstanding shares under a net-worth base and a net-income base. See OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5733.o6(D) (LexisNexis zoo5). The taxpayer must pay tax on the base that produces
the greater tax, with the total tax liability of any corporation being limited to $i5o,ooo per
year. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.o6(G) (LexisNexis 2005).
24 See Cuno, 386 F3d at 741.
25 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 57O9.62(C)(I) (LexisNexis 2005).
26 The plaintiffs were a group of homeowners and small businesses who were encour-
aged to file suit by Ralph Nader's Center for the Study of Responsive Law. See Gillis, supra
note 6, at 360.
27 See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F Supp. 2d i 196, 1 98 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
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ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.28 Although the plaintiffs made several allegations
involving the legality of the property tax exemption, the primary conten-
tion addressed in this Note involves the alleged unconstitutionality of the
investment tax credit granted to DaimlerChrysler. 9 More specifically, the
plaintiffs contended that "the Ohio statutory scheme permitting the in-
vestment tax credit, Ohio Rev. Code § 5733.33, [was] unconstitutional be-
cause it violate[d] the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
and the equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution."3
In determining whether Ohio's investment tax credit scheme violated
the dormant Commerce Clause, the district court judge applied a four-prong
test set forth by the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.31
Under the test, "[a] state tax violates the Commerce Clause if: (1) it lacks
a 'sufficient nexus with the State;' (2) it 'discriminates against interstate
commerce;' (3) it 'is unfairly apportioned;' or (4) 'it is unrelated to services
provided by the State. ' '32 The only disagreement among the parties re-
garding the outcome of the application of the four elements of the Complete
Auto test involved the second element, as the plaintiffs maintained that
the investment tax credit violated the dormant Commerce Clause because
it discriminated against interstate commerce. 33 In construing the second
element of the test as applied to Ohio's investment tax credit scheme, the
district court judge stated:
It is well established that states are not precluded from enact-
ing taxation schemes for the benefit of intrastate commerce and
industry: "Our decision today does not prevent the States from
structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth and de-
velopment of intrastate commerce and industry. Nor do we hold
that a State may not compete with other States for a share of
interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free
trade policy. We hold only that in the process of competition no
State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the
business operations performed in any other State."'
28 See id.
29 Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit concluded that the property tax exemp-
tion did not discriminate against interstate commerce. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386
F3d 738, 748 (6th Cir. 2004); Cuno, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-04.
30 Cuno, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1198. This Note will not address the plaintiffs' equal protec-
tion argument, as both the district court and the three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit held
that the Ohio investment tax credit statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Ohio Constitution. See Cuno, 386 F3 d at 749; Cuno, 154 F. Supp. zd at 1202.
31 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
32 Cuno, 154 F Supp. 2d at 1202 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 277-78 (1977)).
33 Cuno, 154 F Supp. 2d at 1202.
34 See id. (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336-37
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The court then noted that the Supreme Court has held unconstitution-
al two categories of state taxation schemes.3" The first category rejected
by the Supreme Court is a taxation "system that acts as a 'protective tariff
or customs duty, which taxes goods imported from other States, but does
not tax similar products produced in [the] State"' employing the taxation
system.3 6 An example of this type of taxation scheme would be where ABC
Co., which manufactures its products in State B for sale in State A, is subject
to an additional tax, above and beyond what income tax it would normally
pay for the privilege of doing business in State A, on those goods its sells
in State A. Meanwhile, XYZ Co., which manufacturers its products in State
A for sale in State A, would not incur any additional tax on those goods
it sells in State A. The investment tax credit scheme at issue in Cuno did
not operate as a protective tariff or customs duty because it did not place
an added taxation burden on goods produced in other states. As the court
noted, Ohio's investment tax credit "is available equally to businesses re-
gardless of their initial location, so long as they increase the amount of their
Ohio investment."
37
The second category of state taxation held by the Supreme Court as
being an unconstitutional violation of the dormant Commerce Clause is
a scheme that taxes entities or individuals differently depending on the
level of business activity that the taxpayer carries on within a state as com-
pared to business done outside that state.38 The court disCiussed the case of
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully,39 which is the seminal case illustrating this
scheme of unconstitutional taxation. In Westinghouse, the Court considered
the legality of a state tax credit that New York provided to parent corpora-
tions doing business in New York and owning a Domestic International
Sales Corporation ("DISC").40 New York enacted the state tax credit in
response to federal tax legislation that exempted a DISC from federal taxa-
tion on its taxable income, but attributed a portion of the DISC's income
to its shareholders .4 The favorable federal income tax treatment of DISCs
was designed to increase the amount of exports from the United States. 41
As a result of the federal tax legislation regarding the tax treatment of a
DISC, New York found itself conflicted. If it followed the lead of the fed-
eral government and excluded a DISC from taxation on its income for state
('997)).
35 See Cuno, 154 F Supp. 2d at 1203.
36 See id. (quoting West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186,193 (1994)).
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
40 As stated in the case, a corporation qualified as a DISC "if substantially all its assets
and gross receipts are export-related." Id. at 390-91.
41 Seeid. at 391-92.
42 See id. at 390.
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income tax purposes, the state could have lost between twenty and thirty
million dollars annually.43 However, if it taxed a DISC, the state would "dis-
courage their formation in New York and also discourage the manufacture
of export goods within the State."' Accordingly, New York implemented
a taxing scheme that attempted to accommodate both of these interests.
Under the legislation, a DISC's income was consolidated with the income
of its parent, and the state's franchise tax was imposed on the consolidated
taxable income amount reported on the parent corporation's state franchise
tax return.4" A parent corporation would then be accorded a tax credit that
would "lower the effective tax rate on the accumulated DISC income re-
flected in the consolidated return [of the parent corporation] to 30% of the
otherwise applicable franchise tax rate." 6 The DISC credit, however, was
limited by the "New York export ratio" which was the ratio of the DISC's
gross receipts from exports shipped from within New York over the DISC's
total gross receipts for all exports. 47
The discriminatory effect of the New York taxing scheme was clear. A
parent corporation conducting business operations in New York, thus sub-
jecting the corporation to state taxation under New York law, and also own-
ing a DISC engaging in export activity within New York would receive a
larger tax credit than a parent corporation doing business in New York and
owning a DISC that conducted export activity outside of New York. The
court recognized the inequitable character of the New York tax credit leg-
islation vis-a-vis companies owning DISCs that conducted export activities
outside New York. The court then concluded that such a law that "taxed
corporate income but returned a portion of that tax as a credit based on the
proportion of total business activity conducted in New York" represented
an unconstitutional violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.48
Ohio's investment tax credit was analogous to the New York law in that
a company could reduce its existing tax liability in Ohio via a tax credit
(in this case, an investment tax credit) by increasing its investment of new
machinery and equipment in Ohio. However, as the court noted, the New
York law had one critical distinction: "an increase in activity conducted out-
43 See id. at 392. At the time of the enactment of the federal legislation exempting DISCs
from federal taxation, New York did not "impose its franchise tax on distributions received by
a parent from a [DISC] subsidiary." Id. Rather, the DISC subsidiary was taxed directly to the
extent it did business in New York. See id. If New York were to enact DISC legislation similar
to that enacted by Congress, then New York would no longer be able to collect tax on a DISC
doing business in New York, which would result in lost revenues to the state of New York.
44 Id. at 392-93.
45 See id. at 393.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 393-94.
48 Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1 196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (discuss-
ing Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984)).
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side New York would decrease the amount of the credit."49 In contrast to the
New York law, an increase in investment outside of Ohio by a corporation
already doing business in Ohio would not decrease the amount of the cor-
poration's investment tax credit because the corporation would not qualify
for the investment tax credit in the first place (i.e., because its investment
would not be made within the state of Ohio).50 Thus, the district court was
able to distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in Westinghouse from the
facts before it and, therefore, concluded that Ohio's investment tax credit
scheme fell outside of the second category of taxation declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court."1
After finding that Ohio's investment tax credit scheme did not fall
within either of the two categories of taxation schemes declared unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court, the district court granted the defendant's
request to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure." The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision to
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
C. The Sixth Circuit's Reversal
The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's order dismissing the
plaintiffs' claim. 3 Like the district court, the three-judge panel of the Sixth
Circuit used the four-part Complete Auto test.s' More precisely, the court also
focused its analysis on the second element of the test by asking whether
the tax (or investment tax credit scheme in this case) discriminates against
interstate commerce. 5 The unanimous panel of the court stated the gen-
eral rule that a "challenged credit or exemption will fail Commerce Clause
scrutiny if it discriminates on its face or if, on the basis of 'a sensitive, case-
by-case analysis of purposes and effects,' the provision 'will in its practical
operation work discrimination against interstate commerce.' 5' 6 The court
noted that the Supreme Court defined the term "discrimination," as used
in this context, as "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state eco-
nomic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."57
The principal argument set forth by the plaintiffs' on appeal was that
Ohio's investment tax credit discriminated
49 Cuno, 154 E Supp. zd at 1203.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 Seeid. at Izo3-o4.
53 See Cuno, 386 F3d at 742.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 743 (quoting West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994)).




against interstate economic activity by coercing businesses already
subject to the Ohio franchise tax to expand locally rather than out of
state. Specifically, any corporation currently doing business in
Ohio, and therefore paying the state's corporate franchise tax
in Ohio, can reduce its existing tax liability by locating signifi-
cant new machinery and equipment within the state, but it will
receive no such reduction in tax liability if it locates a compa-
rable plant and equipment elsewhere. Moreover, as between
two businesses, otherwise similarly situated and each subject to
Ohio taxation, the business that chooses to expand its local pres-
ence will enjoy a reduced tax burden, based directly on its new
in-state investment, while a competitor that invests out-of-state
will face a comparatively higher tax burden because it will be
ineligible for any credit against its Ohio tax."'
To support their argument, the plaintiffs relied on three Supreme Court
decisions invalidating state tax schemes that encouraged the "development
of local industry by imposing greater burdens on economic activity taking
place outside the state."5 9 While none of these three decisions involved
location investment tax credits, they do, however, indicate the relative ease
with which the Supreme Court has struck down state taxing schemes that
encourage economic activity within a state while simultaneously discrimi-
nating against out-of-state activity.
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,60 the Supreme Court
confronted an amendment to New York's transfer tax on securities trans-
actions. The transfer tax applied to "all sales, or agreements to sell, or
memoranda of sales and all deliveries or transfers of shares or certificates of
stock" made within New York by a corporation.6' Given the fact that New
York was, and to this day is, the focal point of the securities industry in the
United States, it was highly likely that at least one of these five events
would occur within New York during a given security transaction. Under
the unamended version of the transfer tax statute, "a transaction involving
a sale and a transfer of shares in New York was taxed the same as a transac-
tion involving an in-state transfer but an out-of-state sale.
6
However, in the "1960's the New York Stock Exchange became con-
cerned that the New York transfer tax created a competitive disadvantage
for New York trading and was thus responsible for the growth of out-of-
58 Cuno, 386 F3d at 743 (emphasis added).
59 Id.
60 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 3 18 (1977).
6I N.Y.TAx LAW § 270.1 (McKinney 1966).
62 Boston, 429 U.S. at 322.
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state exchanges." 63 Since the transfer tax was neutral as to in-state and out-
of-state sales, there was no obstacle preventing regional stock exchanges
from popping up around the country and expropriating a share of the New
York Stock Exchange's business to themselves. Indeed, regional stock ex-
changes did appear and, in a move designed to protect the New York Stock
Exchange, the New York Legislature responded to this undesirable situa-
tion by amending the transfer tax statute to provide that "transactions by
nonresidents of New York are afforded a 50% reduction in the rate of tax
when the transaction involves an in-state sale." 64 Consequently, an indi-
vidual who sold and transferred a security in New York paid a lower transfer
tax than an individual who transferred a security through New York, but
sold the security on an exchange outside of New York. Undoubtedly, the
effect of this amendment was to reduce out-of-state competition with the
New York Stock Exchange, as a significant economic incentive was created
for nonresident sellers to sell their stock in New York.
The Supreme Court held that the amendment to the transfer tax stat-
ute represented an unconstitutional violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause because it discriminated against interstate commerce. The discrim-
ination occurred because the transfer tax amendment imposed a "great-
er [transfer] tax liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales."6 In
doing so, the amendment offended "the very purpose of the [dormant]
Commerce Clause [which] was to create an area of free trade among the
several States."6 6 Indeed, a free trade area with respect to stock sales ceased
to exist after the amendment, as it became more expensive to make out-of-
state stock sales than it was to make in-state stock sales in New York. The
Court summed up the consequences of New York's transfer tax amend-
ment by stating that "[plermitting the individual States to enact laws that
favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state businesses 'would in-
vite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive' of the free trade
which the [dormant Commerce] Clause protects. '67
The second Supreme Court opinion relied on by the plaintiffs was
Maryland v. Louisiana,68 wherein the Court held unconstitutional a
Louisiana statute that imposed a first-use tax on gas extracted from off-
shore drilling sites in the Gulf of Mexico. As its name implies, the first-use
tax was a tax that was imposed "on the 'first use' of any gas imported into
Louisiana which was not previously subjected to taxation by another State
63 Id. at 323.
64 Id. at 324.
65 Id. at 332.
66 Id. at 328 (quoting McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (internal
quotations omitted)).
67 Id. at 329 (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349,356 (95)).
68 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
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or the United States. ' 69 The first-use tax was equal to the severance tax
that Louisiana imposed on Louisiana gas producers.70 The motive behind
the tax was to "equalize competition between gas produced in Louisiana
and subject to the state severance tax of seven cents per thousand cubic
feet, and gas produced elsewhere not subject to a severance tax. "71
Although this first-use tax may not have been unconstitutional in and
of itself, it was accompanied by several tax credits and exclusions that ul-
timately rendered the statute unconstitutional. 7 The principal tax credit
at issue in the case was the "Severance Tax Credit," which provided an
owner paying the first-use tax on gas drilled offshore a credit in the amount
of any state severance tax owed on account of the extraction of natural
resources within Louisiana. 73 The Court concluded that the Severance Tax
Credit discriminated against interstate commerce because it provided a tax
savings for those engaged in the production of offshore gas to conduct ad-
ditional mineral explorations in Louisiana, rather than in another state.
74
The third case cited by the plaintiffs as support for their proposition
that Ohio's investment tax credit scheme was unconstitutional because it
violated the Commerce Clause was Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully.75 The
facts of this case were discussed earlier in Part II, Section B.
Although Boston Stock Exchange, Maryland, and Westinghouse did not
involve an investment tax credit scheme, they did involve state taxing
schemes designed to promote and encourage the development of local in-
dustry at the expense of other states. Certainly, one could cabin the Ohio
investment tax credit scheme within this unifying feature of these three
cases, as the Ohio investment tax credit's ultimate effect is to attract cor-
porations already doing business in Ohio to make future investments in
depreciable equipment and real property within the state and not in other
jurisdictions.
Perhaps recognizing defeat, the defendants in the case argued that
the Supreme Court's holdings in Boston Stock Exchange, Maryland, and
Westinghouse should be limited to situations where the tax incentives pe-
nalize out-of-state economic activity.76 As has been noted above, Ohio's
investment tax credit did not penalize out-of-state economic activity. A
corporation already doing business in Ohio that decided to make its invest-
ment outside of Ohio would be subject to the same Ohio corporation fran-
69 Id. at 731.
70 See id. at 731. In referring to "Louisiana gas producers" the statute means those gas
producers who obtain their gas from within Louisiana, as opposed to the Gulf of Mexico.
71 Id. at 732.
72 See id. at 760.
73 See id. at 732.
74 See id. at 760.
75 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
76 Cuno, 386 E3d at 745.
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chise tax that it would pay had it never made the out-of-state investment.
According to the defendants:
[Tihe only tax credits and exemptions that would run afoul of
the Commerce Clause fall into two categories: those that func-
tion like a tariff by placing a higher tax upon out-of-state busi-
ness or products and those that penalize out-of-state economic
activity by relying on both the taxpayer's in-state and out-of-
state activities to determine the taxpayer's effective tax rate.7
The defendants also made the argument that Ohio's investment tax
credit was merely a direct subsidy by the state of Ohio.78 The court ac-
knowledged the objective of the defendants' claim by stating that "[t]he
majority in New Energy noted in dicta that subsidies do not 'ordinarily run
afoul of [the Commerce Clause]' because they are not generally 'connected
with the State's regulation of interstate commerce.' 79 Ultimately, the court
rejected both of the defendants' arguments and concluded that Ohio's in-
vestment tax credit statute violated the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution and, therefore, was unconstitutional.'
D. Other Significant Supreme Court Cases Dealing with State Tax Incentives
In addition to the aforementioned Supreme Court opinions relied on by
the plaintiffs in Cuno, there are two other significant Supreme Court deci-
sions involving the constitutionality of state tax incentives. These cases are
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias"' and New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,81
both of which were cited by the Sixth Circuit in Cuno. These two cases
further demonstrate the Court's willingness to strike down a discriminatory
state tax incentive provision and the incredibly steep, uphill climb a party
would likely have in arguing that an investment tax credit like that at issue
in Cuno does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
In Bacchus, the Court was called upon to determine the constitutional-
ity of an exemption from a liquor excise tax imposed on the sale of liquor
in Hawaii.8 3 The exemption was only applicable to wholesalers who sold
77 Id.
78 See id. at 746.
79 Id. (quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (second
alteration in original)).
8o Cuno, 386 E3d at 748. "The Ohio Department of Development has issued an open
letter explaining that it will 'continue to inform qualified companies of the availability of the
credit' while the matter is on appeal." Gillis, supra note 6, at 362 (quoting Open Letter from
Ohio Dep't of Dev.) (Sept. 15, 2004)).
81 Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
82 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
83 See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 265.
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alcoholic beverages containing certain ingredients indigenous to Hawaii.,,
This meant that liquor wholesalers who sold beverages that did not contain
these locally produced ingredients paid higher taxes than their competitors
selling drinks containing these ingredients. This was not an unintended re-
sult, as the legislators enacted the exemption to "encourage development
of the Hawaiian liquor industry."8 The Court struck down the Hawaii li-
quor tax exemption, concluding that it "violated the [dormant] Commerce
Clause because it had both the purpose and effect of discriminating in fa-
vor of local products."'
Limbach involved the constitutionality of an Ohio state tax credit that
could be used to offset the motor vehicle fuel sales tax paid by dealers on
the sale of gasohol (a mixture of gasoline and ethanol) in Ohio." The point
of contention was that the credit was only available to fuel dealers selling
gasohol containing ethanol produced in Ohio or in a state that provided a
similar tax credit for the sale of gasohol containing ethanol produced in
Ohio.88 The Court summed up the discriminatory effects of the Ohio tax
credit provision by noting that it "explicitly deprives certain products of
generally available beneficial tax treatment because they are made in cer-
tain other States, and thus on its face appears to violate the cardinal re-
quirement of nondiscrimination."8 9 As a result of the motor vehicle fuel tax
credit's discrimination toward interstate commerce, the Court held that the
tax credit was unconstitutional because it violated the dormant Commerce
Clause.9°
E. Congressional Response to the Sixth Circuit's Decision
in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler
After the Sixth Circuit panel's decision in Cuno, Senator George V. Voinovich,
R-Ohio, introduced legislation on October I, 2004, intended to overrule the
court's decision by clarifying "that State tax incentives for investment in
new machinery and equipment are a reasonable regulation of commerce
and not an undue burden on interstate commerce, and for other purpos-
es."' In addition, Representative Ben Chandler, D-Kentucky, introduced
similar legislation on December 6, 2004.92 Both bills were referred to com-
84 See id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 273.
87 See Limbach, 486 U.S. at 271.
88 See id.
89 Id. at 274.
9o Id. at 280.
91 See S. z881, io8th Cong. (2004).
92 See H.R. 5427, io8th Cong. (2004).
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mittees and no further action was taken on either bill before the end of the
io8th Congress, meaning that they would have to be reintroduced in the
following session of Congress to be enacted.
On May 18, 2005, Representative Patrick J. Tiberi, R-Ohio, introduced
the Economic Development Act of 2005, which would allow states to pro-
vide tax incentives for economic development purposes "that otherwise
would be the cause or source of discrimination against interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution." 93 Senator
Voinovich introduced an identical version of the House bill in the Senate
on the same date.94 Both versions of the Economic Development Act of
2005 would operate retroactively in that they would insulate previously
enacted state investment tax credit statutes from constitutional attack on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds.95 The two bills do, however, provide
that a number of state tax incentives would not qualify for the Act's protec-
tions, including those incentives that are dependent upon the taxpayer's
state of incorporation or domicile; require the taxpayer to acquire or use
property or services produced in the state; are reduced or eliminated as a
direct result of an increase in out-of-state activity; require other taxing ju-
risdictions to offer reciprocal taxing benefits; or can only be used to reduce
a tax burden on a tax that is not imposed on apportioned interstate activi-
ties.96 To date, aside from being referred to their respective committees, no
further Congressional action has occurred on either bill.
III. CUNO v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER'S IMPACT ON KENTUCKY'S
INVESTMENT TAx CREDIT SCHEME
A. Location Investment Tax Credits in Kentucky
Before we can evaluate the repercussions that the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion in Cuno could potentially have in Kentucky, we must first gain a basic
understanding of the types of tax incentives available to businesses de-
siring to make qualifying investments within Kentucky. Although there
are a number of business tax incentives available in Kentucky, this Note
will specifically focus on the investment tax credits established under the
Kentucky Rural Economic Development Act (KREDA)9 7 program and the
93 H.R. 2471, 1o9th Cong. (2005). The bill defines "economic development purposes" as
"all legally permitted activities for attracting, retaining, or expanding business activity, jobs,
or investment in a State." Id.
94 See S. io66, io9th Cong. (2005).
95 See H.R. 2471, 1o9th Cong. (2005); S. io66, 1o9th Cong. (2005).
96 Id.
97 See generally Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.22-010-.22-102 (LexisNexis 2004).
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Kentucky Industrial Development Act (KIDA)9s program. 99 KREDA and
KIDA are two of the major programs through which investment tax cred-
its are made available to businesses making investments in Kentucky.1 °
Under KREDA, businesses must establish new manufacturing plants or
expand existing manufacturing operations in Kentucky counties meeting
certain unemployment rates in order to qualify. °'0 In contrast, there is no
such requirement for businesses seeking to take advantage of the KIDA
tax incentive program when establishing new manufacturing facilities.
The main qualifications that businesses must meet in order to take ad-
vantage of either the KREDA or KIDA tax incentive programs are that
(1) their new economic development project(s) must involve a minimum
investment of $100,000 and (2) create at least fifteen new full-time jobs. 02
Assuming a business meets the qualifications for the respective tax incen-
tive program, the business may receive up to a 100% credit against the
Kentucky income tax imposed on the taxable income generated by the
project during the business' fiscal year.' 3 The duration of the tax incentives
granted under either program will vary with the program, but the maxi-
mum amount of the credit available will be limited to the business' total
expenditures for the project.104
98 See generally Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.28-O10-.28-140 (LexisNexis 2004).
99 A business seeking to take advantage of the tax credit incentives offered under ei-
ther of these two programs must obtain approval from the Kentucky Economic Development
Finance Authority, which was established within the state's Cabinet for Economic
Development to "encourage economic development, business expansion, and job creation by
providing financial support through an array of financial assistance and tax credit programs."
Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, Business Incentives, http://www.thinkken
tucky.com/kyedc/kybizince.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Kentucky Business
Incentives Website].
joo In 2003 alone, 32 companies received preliminary approval and 24 businesses received
final approval under the KREDA program, with their investments in Kentucky estimated to
be $269 million and $I61 million, respectively. 2003 Ky. CABINET FOR ECON. DEV. ANN. REP. 17,
available at http://www.thinkkentucky.com/kyedc/annual reports/2003%20annual%2Oreport.
pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2005). In addition, those companies receiving preliminary approval
were expected to create 2,482 new jobs in Kentucky while those companies receiving final
approval generated 1,75o additional jobs. Id.
Under the KIDA program in 2003, 53 companies received preliminary approval and 30
businesses received final approval, with their investments in Kentucky estimated to be $625
million and $82! million, respectively. Id. at 16. Those companies receiving preliminary ap-
proval were expected to create 3,533 new jobs in Kentucky, while the companies completing
their KIDA transactions generated 3,464 additional jobs. Id.
IOI See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154.22-040(l) (LexisNexis 2004).
102 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.22-040(3), 154.28-O80(3) (LexisNexis 2004) (specifying
these requirements for the KREDA and KIDA programs, respectively).
103 See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.22-O50(8), 154.28.090(7) (LexisNexis 2004) (indicating
how the KREDA and KIDA credits, respectively, are applied against the income generated by
the economic development projects).
IO4 Under the KREDA program, the duration of the tax incentive credit will "terminate
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B. Constitutionality of Investment Tax Credits Granted
Under KREDA and KIDA
One of the ways in which we can analyze the constitutionality of the in-
vestment tax credits granted under the KREDA and KIDA programs is to
compare and contrast them with the investment tax credit deemed uncon-
stitutional by the Sixth Circuit in Cuno. Clearly, any similarities between
Kentucky's location investment tax credits and the Ohio investment tax
credit at issue in Cuno will lend support to the argument that the credits
made available under the KREDA and KIDA programs are unconstitu-
tional in light of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Cuno. Correspondingly, any
distinctions that can be drawn between Kentucky's investment tax credits
and the Ohio investment tax credit found unconstitutional in Cuno will
strengthen the argument that the KREDA and KIDA tax credits would
not be subject to the precedent established by the Sixth Circuit's ruling in
Cuno.
The most obvious characteristic shared by these three tax credits is the
fact that they are location investment tax credits. As such, they are only
available to businesses making investments in the state where the invest-
ment tax credit is granted. This inherent qualifier means that these "loca-
tion incentives facially distinguish between in-state and out-of-state activi-
ties in specifying the parameters of their applicability."'' 0 This conclusion
is significant because the Cuno court stated that "[i]n general, a challenged
[state tax] credit or exemption will fail Commerce Clause scrutiny if it dis-
criminates on its face ... against interstate commerce.""
One could reasonably conclude that all KREDA and KIDA tax credits
discriminate against interstate commerce, as the Cuno court interpreted the
term "discrimination" in this context as meaning "differential treatment of
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and
burdens the latter."1°7 Certainly, a business choosing to expand or locate new
operations in Kentucky may enjoy a reduced tax burden vis-A-vis a busi-
ness choosing to invest in a state not offering a similar tax credit. Assuming
equal corporate tax rates between the two states, the latter business could
upon the earlier of the full receipt of the maximum amount of inducements by the approved
company or fifteen (I5) years after the activation date [of the project]." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
154.22.050(4) (LexisNexis 2004). The duration of the tax incentive credit under the KIDA
program will "terminate upon the earlier of the full receipt of the maximum amount of in-
ducements by the approved company or ten (to) years from the activation date [of the proj-
ect]." Id. at § 154.28-090(4) (LexisNexis 2004).
105 Enrich, supra note 8, at 433.
IO6 Cuno, 386 E3d at 743 (internal quotations omitted). Neither the district court nor the
Sixth Circuit, however, concluded that the Ohio investment tax credit statute at issue in Cuno
facially discriminated against interstate commerce.
107 Id. (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
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incur a higher tax burden on the incremental income generated from the
new project because the state in which it located its new investment does
not offer a credit similar to the KREDA or KIDA tax credits.
Another, but less important, feature shared by these tax credits is their
respective state's motive in making them available to businesses for cer-
tain qualifying investments. Ohio and Kentucky consciously devised these
tax credits as a means of inducing businesses to make future investments
within their borders, at the expense of other states. 108 In essence, these lo-
cation investment tax credits represented a tradeoff to Ohio and Kentucky,
as they would forego tax revenue in exchange for the economic growth
expected from investment in their state.
There are, however, a number of distinguishing characteristics between
Kentucky's investment tax credits under the KREDA and KIDA programs
and the investment tax credit deemed unconstitutional in Cuno. While
many of these differences merely involve the threshold requirements that
must be met before a business qualifies to take advantage of the invest-
ment tax credits, they do differ in at least one potentially significant re-
spect. The Ohio investment tax credit at issue in Cuno functions as a credit
against a corporation's "existing tax liability."1°9 In contrast, the tax credits
available under the KREDA and KIDA programs may be used to reduce
income generated by the new economic development project."'
Based on this distinction, one could argue that Cuno may be limited
to those matters involving investment tax credits that reduce a business'
"existing tax liability" as opposed to tax credits that operate against the
incremental income generated by a new investment or project.1 ' The Cuno
decision provides some support for this argument, although it did so in the
context of discussing its rationale for holding that the personal property
io8 See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (not-
ing that the purpose of the enactment of the investment tax credit was to "encourage in-
dustrial investment and development in Ohio, particularly in economically troubled areas");
Kentucky Business Incentives Website (indicating that these credits further "the Commonwealth's
goals of achieving long-term economic growth and full employment for its citizens").
109 Cuno, 386 E3d at 743 (emphasis added); see OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33(B)(i)
(LexisNexis 2005) (indicating that the investment tax credit is allowed against the corporation
franchise tax imposed on taxpayer corporation). OHlo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.33(C)(4) pro-
vides that the credit must be taken evenly over this tax return and the following six returns,
beginning in the tax year immediately following the calendar year in which the new manufac-
turing machinery and equipment is purchased.
i o See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.22-050(8)(a), 154.28-090(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (in-
dicating that the KREDA and KIDA credits, respectively, may be used against the Kentucky
income tax that would be owed "on the income of the approved company generated by or
arising from the economic development project").
iii But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler:A Critique, 105 Tax NOTES 225,
226 (2004) (questioning the Cuno court's suggestion that an investment tax credit that reduces
pre-existing income tax liability is unconstitutional while the same credit would not be un-
constitutional when issued in the form of a property tax exemption).
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tax exemption did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The court
noted that
Unlike an investment tax credit that reduces pre-existing in-
come tax liability, the personal property exemption does not re-
duce any existing property tax liability. The exemption merely
allows a taxpayer to avoid tax liability for new personal prop-
erty put into first use in conjunction with a qualified new in-
vestment. Thus, a taxpayer's failure to locate new investments
within Ohio simply means that the taxpayer is not subject to
the state's property tax at all, and any discriminatory treatment
between a company that invests in Ohio and one that invests
out-of-state cannot be attributed [to] the Ohio tax regime or its
failure to reduce current property taxes.... Every new invest-
ment, no matter where undertaken, would be exempt from a
[Ohio] tax. Thus, businesses that desire to expand are neither
discriminated against nor pressured into investing in Ohio.'
The Sixth Circuit's approach in Cuno appears to have come from the
reasoning advanced by Professors Hellerstein and Coenen who argue that
there is a distinction between exemptions or reductions that merely reduce
a business' existing tax liability and those that reduce "additional state tax
liability to which the taxpayer would be subjected only if the taxpayer were
to engage in the targeted activity in the state.""' 3 Professors Hellerstein and
Coenen note that the effect of the latter types of exemptions or reductions
differ from the effect of the tax incentives at issue in the cases the Supreme
Court has dealt with in the past."4 According to the two professors, in the
prior tax-incentive cases that the Supreme Court addressed, the states were
basically telling businesses:
You are already subject to our taxing power because you engage
in taxable activity in this state. If you would like to reduce your
tax burdens, you may do so by directing additional business ac-
tivity into this state. Should you decline our invitation, we will
continue to exert our taxing power over you as before, and your
tax bill might even go up.115
Under Hellerstein and Coenen's test, location investment tax credits that
reduce a business' existing tax liability discriminate against interstate com-
I 12 Cuno, 386 F3d at 747-48.
113 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 8, at 807.
114 See id.
i5 Id. at 8o8.
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merce because they favor in-state over out-of-state activity and involve the
"coercive power of the state." 116
On the other hand, Hellerstein and Coenen argue that location invest-
ment tax credits that reduce additional state tax liability that would be
generated from the project do not "favor in-state over out-of-state invest-
ment... nor do they rely on the coercive power of the state to compel a
choice favoring in-state investment."117 In the context of a property tax ex-
emption, Hellerstein and Coenen note that the states would, in effect, be
saying: "Come to our state and we will not saddle you with any additional
property tax burdens. Moreover, should you choose not to accept our invi-
tation, nothing will happen to your tax bill-at least nothing that depends
on our taxing regime."
1 1 8
Presumably, this same line of thinking could be extended to investment
tax credits like those under the KREDA and KIDA programs that reduce
the incremental income generated by the new investment or project.
IV. ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MECHANISMS FOR KENTUCKY
A. Needfor Alternative Economic Development Mechanisms
Based on the above discussion, it is not clear whether the Cuno decision,
should it stand, would render the investment tax credits made available un-
der the KREDA and KIDA programs unconstitutional. It would appear that
under a literal reading of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cuno, the KREDA
and KIDA investment tax credits, while equally available to in-state and
out-of-state businesses, could be said to facially discriminate against inter-
state commerce because the credits are only given to businesses making
in-state investments. However, it may be that Cuno only applies to invest-
ment tax credits that reduce a taxpayer's pre-existing tax liability. If so, the
KREDA and KIDA credits would probably not fall under Cuno.
This inability to accurately predict how Cuno, or Congress for that mat-
ter, will ultimately affect Kentucky's investment tax credits under the
KREDA and KIDA programs raises a significant problem if one subscribes
to the notion that tax incentives, such as investment tax credits, factor
into a business' investment location decision. As pointed out by Michigan,
Kentucky, and Tennessee in their amici curiae brief, this uncertainty may
have a chilling effect on all states within the Sixth Circuit, as businesses
may be wary of undertaking future investments in these states for fear that
the investment tax credits granted to them may be rendered unconstitu-
i 16 Id. at 8o6.
117 Id. at 807.
i18 Id. at 8o8.
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tional under Cuno."9 Accordingly, it is useful to discuss some alternatives
that Kentucky could employ in place of the investment tax credits under
the KREDA and KIDA programs.
B. State Subsidization of Business
One constitutional alternative that could be employed by Kentucky would
be the less glamorous, old-fashioned state subsidy. The approach here
would be for Kentucky to induce businesses to make their investments
within the state in exchange for a direct cash subsidy. One may reasonably
question whether a distinction can be drawn between an investment tax
credit and a direct cash subsidy, as both provide favorable economic treat-
ment only to businesses making in-state investments. Nevertheless, state
subsidies differ from investment tax credits in that subsidies come from
existing state revenues and must be appropriated by the legislature, while
investment tax credits constitute foregone tax revenues. Consequently,
subsidies are by nature a more visible and political means of providing lo-
cation incentives to businesses than investment tax credits.2 0
The primary authoritative support for the constitutionality of state sub-
sidies comes from the relatively recent Supreme Court decision in WestLynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.' In this case, the Court confronted a Massachusetts
tax that required every milk dealer in the state to pay a "monthly 'premium
payment' into the 'Massachusetts Dairy Equalization Fund."'"" 2 Thus, the
"premium payment" or tax itself was nondiscriminatory, as it was imposed
regardless of where the milk was produced, such that both in-state and out-
of-state milk producers selling milk in Massachusetts were subject to the
tax. The revenue generated from this tax was then placed into a separate
fund. Controversy arose when Massachusetts took the money kept in the
fund and, on a monthly basis, distributed it solely to Massachusetts produc-
ers. ' 3 In effect, the Massachusetts milk producers received a tax rebate or
subsidy for the monthly tax for which they were responsible. Meanwhile,
the out-of-state milk producers received no such rebate.
i9 Brief for State of Michigan, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees' Suggestion
for Rehearing En Banc at 6, Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc., 386 F3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004) (No.
00-07247).
120 See Enrich, supra note 8, at 442-43. But see Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics
to the Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on
Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHo N.U. L. REV. 29, 52 (2002) (arguing that it is "an inaccurate, if
commonly invoked oversimplification, that direct subsidies are necessarily scrutinized more
frequently than tax incentives," which are made visible by tax expenditure budgets).
121 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (994).
122 Id. at 9o.
123 Id. at 191.
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As the Court indicated, the premium payments by the out-of-state
milk producers, combined with the tax rebates to in-state producers, made
"milk produced out of State more expensive.""2 4 Therefore, the Court held
that the Massachusetts scheme discriminated against interstate commerce
in violation of the Commerce Clause and struck down the scheme as un-
constitutional.
Despite the Court's opinion invalidating the use of state subsidies to
in-state milk producers, West Lynn Creamery does not stand for the proposi-
tion that the use of state subsidies as a means of encouraging local develop-
ment is always unconstitutional. In fact, Justice Stevens' majority opinion
specifically states that "[a] pure subsidy funded out of general revenue
ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists
local business." ' In addition, the majority went on to say in a footnote that
the Court has "never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies,
and we need not do so now. We have, however, noted that 'direct subsidi-
zation of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul' of the negative
Commerce Clause." 12 6
Justice Stevens' opinion indicates that the use of subsidies in this case
was unconstitutional because the subsidies paid to the in-state milk pro-
ducers were "funded principally from taxes on the sale of milk produced in
other States."'217 Had the premium payments been paid into Massachusetts'
general fund, rather than a segregated fund, and then distributed to the in-
state milk producers, the use of state subsidies likely would not have been
declared unconstitutional.1 2 1 Professors Hellerstein and Coenen conclude
that courts properly interpreting West Lynn Creamery "should not treat state
subsidies afforded to local businesses the same as tax breaks that discrimi-
nate in their favor; rather, courts should strike down only those subsidies
that operate ... as discriminatory de facto rebates of an identifiable state
tax." 129
There are, however, a number of potential drawbacks to Kentucky em-
barking on the path of using state subsidies as a vehicle for economic de-
velopment in the state. First, there is the question of funding the subsidies.
In order for Kentucky to provide subsidies to businesses, the money would
have to be appropriated by the Kentucky legislature and would comprise
an item in the state's annual budget. Consequently, ceteris paribus, funds
would have to be allocated away from other state projects currently receiv-
ing state funding. One can imagine the heated political battles that would
124 Id. at 194.
125 Id. at 199.
126 Id. at 199, n.15.
127 Id. at 199.
128 See generally id. at 199-200.
129 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 8, at 838.
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ensue with this practice of taking state funds away from an existing recipi-
ent (e.g., a state university) and giving them to a business in the form of a
direct cash subsidy.
Second, the Court has yet to provide a bright-line rule that all cash sub-
sidies are constitutional. Since investment tax credits and direct cash sub-
sidies have virtually the same effect, subsidies could very well be on shaky
constitutional ground. 130
Third, it may well be that both investment tax credits and direct cash
subsidies are completely unnecessary mechanisms for increasing state eco-
nomic development in Kentucky. Many state tax scholars and commenta-
tors contend that it is futile for states to use state taxes and tax incentives
as means of spurring economic development, as businesses choose the
location of their investments largely independent of tax considerations."3
These scholars point out that state taxes represent a very small cost to busi-
nesses because of their deductibility for federal income tax purposes, 3 ' and
that there are other, more significant factors that determine where busi-
nesses establish their investments. Some of these considerations include
the skill level and cost of labor, the proximity of the location to customers
and suppliers, and utility costs.' 33 Assuming that state taxes and tax incen-
tives play little or no role in a business' investment decision, then it is
logical to conclude that a state offering a cash subsidy or an investment
tax credit as a way of furthering economic development would merely be
wasting its resources, or foregoing additional tax revenue in the case of
an investment tax credit, and would be better served using the funds for
another purpose. 134
C. Lowering Corporate Income Tax Rates
Another potential method by which Kentucky could enhance the state's
attractiveness as a location for economic development would be to lower
its corporate income tax rates. Several state tax commentators have noted
130 See Zelinsky, supra note i i i, at 46 (maintaining that, "[slince virtually any tax
incentive can, in design and economic effect, be recast as a direct expenditure program [like
a subsidy], there is no compelling basis" for a distinction between investment tax credits and
direct cash subsidies).
131 See Enrich, supra note 8, at 392; Richard D. Pomp, The Role of State Tax Incentives in
Attracting and Retaining Business: A View From New York, 29 TAx NOTES 52!, 522-23 (1985);
Andrew Kolesar, Can State and Local Tax Incentives and Other Contributions Stimulate Economic
Development, 44 TAX LAw. 285, 310(1990).
132 See I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (West 2004), which provides businesses with a federal income
tax deduction for state and local income taxes paid.
133 See Enrich, supra note 8, at 392; Pomp, supra note 131, at 522-23.
134 Note that in the event a business has identified two potential sites, each in a different
state, that are equal in all respects other than the fact that one state does not grant investment
tax credits, it is logical that investment tax credits could serve as a tie breaker.
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that it would be unlikely for the Supreme Court to hold that state corporate
income tax rate reductions would violate the dormant Commerce Clause.1
35
Support for their view is buttressed by the Supreme Court's indication that
"the appropriate level or rate of taxation is essentially a matter for legisla-
tive, and not judicial, resolution."'13 6 Presuming that reductions by a state
in its corporate income tax are constitutional, the exact rate reduction for
Kentucky would be a matter for its legislature to determine.
Although there are numerous considerations that Kentucky would
have to address before it enacted legislation providing for the reduction
of its corporate income tax rates, there are two that are pertinent to this
discussion. First, like the use of investment tax credits, a state's decision
to reduce its corporate income taxes would likely be grounded, in part, on
its desire to attract in-state economic development. Based on the Court's
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, one could make the reasonable
argument that since rate reductions ultimately are indistinct from invest-
ment tax credits with respect to their economic result (i.e., businesses wind
up facing lower state income tax burdens), they too discriminate against
interstate commerce. And second, if it is true that businesses largely do not
make their siting decisions based on state taxes and tax incentives, then
Kentucky would unnecessarily be giving up tax revenue by lowering its
corporate income tax rates.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Cuno has definitely created a stir within
the state and local tax community with respect to the constitutionality of
creating investment tax credits as a means of promoting and encouraging
in-state economic development. Unfortunately, the court's decision makes
it far from clear whether the investment tax credits granted by the KREDA
and KIDA programs represent unconstitutional violations of the dormant
Commerce Clause. A broad reading of the Cuno court's opinion tends to
support the notion that these tax credits are unconstitutional because they
appear, in one respect, to facially discriminate against interstate commerce,
as the credits may only be taken advantage of by taxpayers making in-state
investments in Kentucky. However, as the court pointed out, the Ohio in-
vestment tax credit at issue reduced the taxpayer's existing tax liability.137
135 See Enrich, supra note 8, at 459 (stating that "it would be a shocking development
if state choices about uniformly applied tax rates were to become objects of Commerce
Clause scrutiny"); Zelinsky, supra note i i i, at 228 (arguing that it would be "anomalous to
conclude that states cannot reduce their corporate [income] tax rates without violating the
nondiscrimination test of Complete Auto") (emphasis added).
136 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 627 (1981).
137 See Cuno, 386 E3d at 743.
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In contrast, the investment tax credits granted under the KREDA and
KIDA programs only reduce the incremental income associated with the
new investment. It is uncertain whether or not this distinction between the
two states' investment tax credits is significant enough to preclude Cuno
from serving as a precedent for attacking Kentucky's investment tax cred-
its. Should the Supreme Court grant the Cuno petitioner's request for a writ
of certiorari, we may someday have clearer guidance as to the tax incentives
a state can constitutionally enact without violating the dormant Commerce
Clause.
Even if the investment tax credits granted pursuant to the KREDA
and KIDA programs are deemed unconstitutional, there are other mecha-
nisms less vulnerable to constitutional attack that Kentucky could enact
that would help it attract investment within the state. Two such alterna-
tives include the use of direct cash subsidies and/or the reduction of the
state's corporate income tax rates. There are disadvantages associated with
each of these alternatives. Even if not using either of these mechanisms,
Kentucky should consider, before deciding on a particular course of action,
the possibility that state taxes and tax incentives play a very minor role in a
business' siting decision and that the state would be better off focusing on
those considerations that carry more significance.
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